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Abstract
The following article looks into the concept of the middle-income trap. 
First it focuses in Latin America as the region is home to several cases 
of said phenomenon and demonstrates the different struggles various 
nations go through to overcome it. It also analyses what other regions, 
like Asia Pacific, have done to deal with middle income. Afterwards it 
concentrates in Chile to analyze how it has dealt with the middle-income 
trap. Concludes that while Chile has gone a long way to progress and 
reach very high levels of income, there are still several aspects in their 
economy must change in order to fully escape the problems that coincide 
with the aforementioned phenomenon.
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Resumen
El presente artículo analiza el concepto de la trampa del ingreso 
medio. Primero se enfoca en América Latina, ya que la región alberga 
varios casos de dicho fenómeno, y demuestra las diferentes luchas que 
atraviesan varias naciones para superarlo. También se analiza la manera 
en que otras regiones, como Asia Pacífico, han tratado el ingreso medio. 
Luego, el artículo se enfoca en Chile y analiza el comportamiento de este 
fenómeno en el país austral, para concluir que si bien Chile ha recorrido 
un largo camino para progresar y alcanzar niveles altos de ingreso, aún 
hay varios aspectos que su economía debe cambiar para poder escapar 
a la problemática que implica la trampa del ingreso medio.
Palabras clave
Chile, América Latina, Asia Pacific, trampa del ingreso medio, políticas 
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Introduction
The commodity boom that started in the first years of this millennium, 
made most Latin American economies dependent on commodity exports 
at high-income levels borders. Promising policies targeted at increasing 
the overall welfare across the region were possible due to increased 
government revenues during the boom. As commodity exports started to 
show a decline and as terms of trade deprived for virtually all nations in 
Latin America, countries in the region encountered stronger incentives to 
undertake structural reforms (Loman, 2015).
This article aims at outlining a blueprint for action, abstracting relevant 
measures for the case of Chile, one out of only two Latin American 
economies that have been able to overcome the so-called middle-income 
trap. By critically assessing public policy decisions that the Chilean 
government has undergone short before, but especially after its return 
to democracy, it aims at shedding light to the importance of investing in 
innovation, research and development, in order for a country to sustain 
economic growth that allows an increased social welfare.
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Currently, Latin American countries score poorly in infrastructure, 
education and competitiveness. Furthermore, evidence shows that 
the level of technological complexity often related to the investment in 
research and development sharply declined during the years of the boom 
(IBID). During that period of time, policymakers comfortably spent money 
without targeting investment to long-term strategies that would allow for an 
increase in welfare that could be sustained over time. 
Latin America remains being the most unequal region in the world and 
the reversed trend in growth of income evidences a need for structural re-
forms. The Chilean experience in overcoming the middle-income trap and 
its attempts to improve social conditions can prove to be useful for other 
countries in the region replicating those measures, some of which have 
been resembled already as it is the case of exports promotion. This article 
includes an analysis of the weaker points of the Chilean model, backed 
with recent literature about the topic, the current state of economic indica-
tors, and the valuable input of Christian Fresard, former representative of 
Chile in the WTO and director of the Latin American division of the Chilean 
Exports Promotion Agency.
Income levels across the region
The World Bank categorizes countries according to their income levels 
in 4 different categories: low-income, lower middle-income, upper middle-
income and high-income economies. For the current 2018 fiscal year, the 
categories are defined as summarized in table 1.
Table 1. Income categories
Source: World Bank Data Help Desk, 2018.
Income levels in Latin America are as diverse as the countries that 
are part of the region. Measured in terms of gross national income per 
capita calculated with the World Bank Atlas method (2016), income levels 
in the region range from USD $780 – in Haiti (a low-income economy), to 
USD $15.230 – in Uruguay (a high-income economy). According to data 
from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (UN-
ECLA) the region is the world’s most unequal one: inequalities are to be 
found not only within countries, but also between them as evidenced by 
Table 2 (Bárcena & Byanyima, 2016). Table 2 shows how Latin American 
countries are classified according to income levels and presents them 
ordered by population.
Value (min) Value (max) Category
$- $ 1.005 Low-income 
$ 1.006 $ 3.955 Lower middle-income 
$ 3.956 $ 12.235 Upper middle-income 
$ 12.236 $ 99.999 High-income 
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Table 2: Classification of Latin American Economies according to 
income levels
Table 2: World Bank Open Data, 2018.
It is noticeable that 17 out of 20 economies in the region belong to the 
categories of lower middle-income and upper-middle income. In short, 85% 
of Latin American countries are middle-income economies. Haiti is the sole 
country in Latin America that remains being classified as a low-income 
economy. The remaining two, Chile and Uruguay, belong to the category high-
income. Critics are vocal about the inaccuracy of this kind of classifications in 
effectively reflecting the economic realities of the countries subject to analysis.
When analyzing the categories, it is important to be aware about the 
implications of such classifications. The fact that the majority of Latin American 
countries belong to the category of middle-income economies tells little 
about the class structures within the countries and the disparities in income 
distribution that still pose a huge challenge for governments across the region. 
For that aim, the Gini Index is a more adequate measure. As coined by the 
Glossary of statistical terms of the Organization for Economic Development 
and Cooperation (OECD), “the Gini index measures the extent to which the 
Country
Income Level - GNI per capita, 
Atlas method (current US$) Category
Brazil $ 8.840,00 Upper middle-income
Mexico $ 9.040,00 Upper middle-income
Colombia $ 6.310,00 Upper middle-income
Argentina $ 11.970,00 Upper middle-income
Peru $ 5.950,00  Upper middle-income
Venezuela* $ 11.760,00 Upper middle-income
Ecuador $ 5.800,00 Upper middle-income
Guatemala $ 3.790,00 Lower middle-income
Cuba* $ 6.570,00 Upper middle-income
Haiti $ 780,00 Low-income
Bolivia $ 3.070,00 Lower middle-income
Dominican Republic $ 6.390,00 Upper middle-income
Honduras $ 2.150,00 Lower middle-income
Paraguay $ 4.060,00 Upper middle-income
Nicaragua $ 2.100,00 Lower middle-income
El Salvador
Costa Rica
$ 3.920,00 Lower middle-income
$ 10.840,00 Upper middle-income
Panama $ 12.140,00  Upper middle-income
Uruguay $ 15.230,00 High-income
Chile $ 13.540,00 High-income
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wealthier economies on capital-intensive products with limited resources 
available to invest in innovation. That is an economic nightmare.
The challenges of the middle-income trap have been long identified by 
economists and ways to overcome it include (1) targeting investments to key 
areas relevant for economic development and (2) building strong institutions. 
Regarding the (1) aspect, investments should be targeted at education that 
allows for higher-skilled individuals to join the working-age population, at 
improving infrastructure and communications, and at increasing research and 
development (R&D) that fosters innovations. Those were generally included 
in the strategies pursued by the developmental states of East Asia, leading 
macroeconomic planning activities. Japan, Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan followed such postulates and were able to overcome the middle-
income trap.
Subsidies, export promotions, low-interest and condonable credits 
directed towards key industries or industries of national importance together 
with the argument of protecting infant industries were also some of the 
strategies pursued by East Asian economies. The former president and 
dictator of South Korea - Park Chun-hee’s said, “In order for a country not to 
fall, it must cultivate its own strength”. This is one of his most famous quotes 
(Shin, 2006). Those measures were directed exactly at doing so. In addition to 
that and regarding the (2) aspect, those measures were successful thanks to 
the transparent and strong institutions that directed the resources to key areas 
enabling and supporting economic development.
Recent literature has proved that Latin America not only lacks such 
institutions, but that there are no demands for those in the region’s society 
(Doner & Schneider, 2016). Subsidies can prove to increase competitiveness. 
Nevertheless, without a strong institutional framework that prevents corruption, 
subsidies are likely to be unfairly distributed, increasing inequalities and not 
benefiting the economy as a whole.
An example of that is “Agro Ingreso Seguro”: a government program that 
was implemented during the mandate of Álvaro Uribe Vélez in Colombia 
in order to provide subsidies to farmers that allowed them to improve their 
productivity to better face the process of internationalization. On September 
7th 2009, Cambio magazine denounced that 72.500 million Colombian pesos 
(around 30 million US dollars at that time) that were originally intended to 
strengthen the Colombian peasantry had been handed over to 100 traditionally 
wealthy families in the regions of Magdalena and Valle del Cauca.
The idea of subsidizing agricultural production in order to increase 
competitiveness in the international level is a widespread protectionist practice 
to be found even in more developed European and North American countries. 
Those subsidies did not work in Colombia due to a lack of transparent and 
strong institutions that foster honesty. Little was done after the scandal in order 
to start a much needed land reform: one of the structural causes of inequality 
not only in Colombia but also across the region.
The East Asian developmental states conducted similar macroeconomic 
policies to those implemented following the Import Substitution Industrialization 
model (ISI). The model as it stands is a way for developing markets to look 
into self-sufficiency and not need to depend on developed nations. “It aimed 
at strengthening the domestic production of those goods that were previously 
imported. A (…) state-led model of development and thus reflects internal 
decision-making processes” (Neumann, 2013: 1). 
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distribution of income among individuals or households within an economy 
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution” (OECD, 2018).
According to the Gini Index, 0 represents perfect equality while an index 
of 100 represents perfect inequality. Using estimates from the World Bank, by 
2015 the average Gini index in Latin America reached levels over 50, indicating 
deep inequalities. It is important to say that around 1/3 of the data was missing 
when the calculation was done but it certainly sheds light to the widespread 
phenomenon of income inequalities in the region. Having clarified that a 
country being classified as middle-income has little to nothing to do with the 
size of its middle class and in spite of being the most unequal region in the 
world, the middle class in Latin America has experienced tremendous growth 
during past years.
In various countries in the region, more than 50 million people became 
members of the middle class in the decade between 2002 and 2012. That 
number represents an increase of around 50% of the middle class (Ferreira et 
al., 2012). According to a report published by the World Bank, Latin America’s 
middle class has hit a record high of historic relevance. One third of Latin 
American families are now considered to be middle class, pegged with an 
equivalent reduction in the proportion of the region’s share of the poor (World 
Bank Group, 2012). The latter implies that Latin Americans are moving up the 
income ladder, even in the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis of 
2008-2009.
The aforementioned facts appear promising for the region and might 
imply there is a correlation between the increasing size of the middle class 
and the fact that most of the economies in Latin America managed to make 
the move from low-income to middle-income. Nevertheless, a correlation is 
not the same as causation. In fact, 85% of the countries in the region might 
be heading to an economic “trap” and the increase in the size of their middle 
classes might be masking the need for deeper economic reforms that tackle 
economic inequalities from their roots.
The middle-income trap
Of 101 countries that were classified as middle-income economies in the 
1960s, only 13 of them managed to trespass the threshold and become high-
income economies almost 50 years later (Agénor, Canuto, & Jelenic, 2012). 
Most of those countries were dynamic Asian economies including South Korea 
and Singapore. Only two Latin American countries made it to the list: Chile and 
Uruguay. The rest are stuck in the middle-income category, and some of them 
even for decades now.
The middle-income trap is a concept widely used by “developmental 
economists to describe a newly industrializing economy that reaches a mean 
income threshold usually about USD $11.000 (…) which begins to compro-
mise the economy’s competitive advantages in low-wage manufacturing” 
(Shambaugh, 2016). In the region, and as evidenced by Table 2, at least 
6 countries are bordering the threshold: Argentina, Panama, Venezuela, 
Costa Rica, Mexico and Brazil. What follows is a shift in the labor market: a 
phenomenon tied with the “Lewis Turning Point”. The turning point describes 
a phenomenon where cheap labor (mostly originating from rural migration to 
urban centers) begins to exhaust, pushing wages up.
According to Taylor (2017), “many of Latin America’s largest economies are 
stuck in the so- called middle-income trap”. When wages go up, productivity 
growth slows down. Countries with middle-income economies cannot compete 
with low-income economies on labor-intensive products requiring large 
quantities of unskilled labor. In addition to that, they cannot compete with 
MAP | REVISTA MUNDO ASIA PACÍFICO | Vo. 8, No. 1324
Those measures did not work in Latin America due to a clear lack of 
an appropriate institutional framework. States in the region were setting the 
wrong priorities, deepening income inequalities and structural poverty. The 
implementation of the ISI model did not increase competitiveness across 
the region; it unfairly directed resources to historically privileged groups with 
strong lobbying capacity and fostered an inefficient allocation of resources 
together with a widespread corruption. During that time, short-term measures 
were preferred over long-term reforms that could actively shape the path of 
overcoming the middle- income trap.
The ISI model was replaced in the region with the so-called Washington 
Consensus rooted in the ideas of free market and trade liberalization. Latin 
American economies perceived a shock after opening to international 
trade, with inefficient industries and poorly allocated factors of production 
that configured an atmosphere where competitiveness was nowhere to be 
seen. What those countries did essentially, was “Kicking away the ladder” 
of economic development. Quoting Chang (2002): “Almost all of today's rich 
countries used tariff protection and subsidies to develop their industries. 
Interestingly, Britain and the USA, the two countries that are supposed to have 
reached the summit of the world economy through their free-market, free-
trade policy, are actually the ones that had most aggressively used protection 
and subsidies.”
Blindly trusting the markets to determine prices is increase dependency 
of Latin American countries to commodity exports (intensive in low-skilled 
labor), worsening terms of trade and making them vulnerable to market 
prices fluctuations. In short: it would make Latin American countries unable to 
overcome the middle-income trap. Demonizing macroeconomic policies that 
are protectionist in nature just because of the sake that they are protectionist 
is not going to help countries increase their competitiveness in industries of 
national relevance that allow for a cultivation of a country’s own strength.
Taylor (2017) connects the arguments of Doner & Schneider (2016) 
with the reality of large Latin American middle-income economies such as 
Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Peru. A lot of different indicators show how far 
Latin American countries are from taking measures in line with the ways of 
overcoming the trap. 
In summary: 
1. Regarding investment in research and development: “Latin American
countries have less than ¼ of high-skilled workers in the field of R&D in com-
parison to high-income Asian countries (…) R&D spending is less than ¼ of 
their richer peers.”
2. Regarding investment in education: “The share of the labor force that
has higher education is less than 60 percent that of the wealthy countries (…) 
Latin middle-income countries’ scores on PISA educational attainment tests 
are over 1/5 lower than their wealthy peers (…) Informal employment is above 
50 percent on average (…) The shadow economy has been growing, rather 
than shrinking.” 
It is not a secret either that investment in infrastructure and connectivity is 
way behind in Latin America. Taking a glance at the logistics performance index 
of East Asian economies and comparing them to Latin American ones can 
easily prove that. Some remarks by the OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría 
during the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos during 
a private session titled Prioritizing Policy for Inclusive Productivity included 
that the middle-income trap in Latin America “(…) Is traced to the inability of 
countries to undergo a process of structural change towards innovation and 
more knowledge-intensive production” (Gurría, 2017).
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Paus (2014) distinguishes between two different approaches to the 
middle-income trap after extensively reviewing literature on the unprecedented 
challenge of overcoming it. The first approach has a focus on “the lack of 
structural change, the driving forces behind it and the national and global 
context in which it unfolds”. The other approach “stresses growth slowdowns 
irrespective of time and place”. The author favors the structural change 
approach and concludes that the experience of latecomer countries trying to 
overcome the middle-income trap such as Chile, Dominican Republic, Jordan, 
Ireland, and Singapore “suggest that a cohesive productive capabilities-
focused development strategy holds out great promise for generating growth-
enhancing structural change.” Again, just leaving Latin American economies 
vulnerable to the (not so) “free market” is not likely allow for a transition from 
middle-income to high-income.
La mención de Zhuang Zi deja claro hasta dónde quiere remontarse el e
Chile overcoming middle income: a case of study
Chile has had a unique experience in becoming a high-income country. It 
currently ranks as the 33rd most competitive country in the world4, while Brazil 
and Argentina rank 80th and 92nd respectively, being the most competitive 
country in South America and one of the most within the American continent. 
The realities of this growth are primarily thanks to political reforms that have 
allowed not only connecting with the global market on an important scale, 
but also promoting Chilean exports and establishing mechanisms to counter 
the effects of economic crisis, especially those faced back in 2008. Chile has 
been able to sustain growth through internal structures.
“(…) Chile's economy has proved resilient and entered the crisis with a 
fundamentally strong position. This owes much to its sound policy framework, 
including an inflation- targeting regime, a flexible exchange rate, and a prudent 
 S-F / Shutterstock.com
4 This ranking is based off of the World Economic 
Forum’s The Global Competitiveness Report 
2017-2018.
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budget rule. Large fiscal savings accumulated in past years have been critical 
to preserving macroeconomic stability and covering financial needs, while the 
banking system remains well capitalized. The policy response has also played 
an important role in buffering the impact of the crisis. The government’s bank 
liquidity support and economic stimulus measures have been sizable, well 
balanced, and coordinated” (Chile, 2017: 117).
This case study analyses how Chile managed to achieve high-income 
within a context of many middle-income countries yet look to see if they have 
been able to avoid the infamous “middle income trap” in doing so. It will show 
that through policy reform a country can be able to aspire to develop at a 
standard that both benefits their economy and their social structures.
Commodity economy?
One of the first aspects that spark interest into viewing Chile’s story is to 
look at what its GDP is made up of. While the notion of high-income countries 
is that of being able to diversify their exports to avoid commodity dependence, 
literature often asserts that the Chilean economy still depends heavily on one 
commodity as copper. “The country is over dependent on copper exports, 
which account for 50% of its total exports. According to the Chilean Copper 
Commission, copper exports declined from USD 43.6 billion in 2011 to USD 
26.1 billion in 2016. A further fall in prices would negatively affect government 
budgets and its planned spending program” (Chile, 2017: page 25). This is 
very interesting to elaborate into how Chile has managed to become a high-
income country.
The Observatory for Economic Complexity ranked in 2016 the most im-
portant exports Chile had during that year. They provided the following list: 
Refined Copper (USD 14.9B); Copper Ore (USD 13.7B); Sulfate Chemical 
Woodpulp (USD 2.64B); Raw Copper (USD 2.35B); Fish Fillets (USD 2.12B); 
Refined Petroleum (USD 3.6B); Cars (USD 3.28B); Crude Petroleum (USD 
2.45B); Delivery Trucks (USD 1.71B); Broadcasting Equipment (USD 1.56B) 
(OEC database, 2018).
Christian Fresard is former representative of the Chilean government in the 
World Trade Organization and Director for Latin America of ProChile (Chile’s 
Export Promotions Agency). In an interview, Fresard defended the fact copper 
and other natural resources are important in the share of Chilean exports, but 
there are other very important sectors in the economy such as tourism, which 
do not depend on the extraction of natural resources. There are also industries 
based on natural resources, such as the wine sector, but their economic con-
tribution lies in the added value that is given to the product in addition to the 
sustainable management that is given to the resources.
Taking an isolated glance at exports provides for a wrongful interpretation 
of the economy’s composition: The mistake most scholars do. As of today, 
the Chilean economy is far from being an economy that is dependent on the 
extraction of natural resources. GDP composition data by 2016 gathered by 
the World Development Indicators databank showed that agriculture accoun-
ted for 4% of the economy’s output, industry for 31%, manufacturing for 12% 
and services for 64%. Ever since 2005, the structure of economic output has 
been migrating from industry and manufacturing to services: Chile’s strongest 
economic sector today. The latter goes in line with Fresard’s argument and his 
example of tourism as a pillar of the services share of the GDP.
The OEC lists the major recipients of Chilean exports, which are, in order 
of importance: China, the USA, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil, all of which 
are relevant copper markets. There is no doubt that copper is still an important 
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part not only of exports, but also of the Chilean’s government revenue, with 
at least 20% of it originating in copper exports. Nevertheless, exports do not 
provide the entire picture of economic composition and performance.
Analyzing exports, it can be contested that Chile is dependent on raw ma-
terials. Grouping the Chilean exports in categories, we see that the first sector 
continues being copper, followed by automobiles, fish fillets and electronics. 
Copper and copper derivatives have, as explored above, a disproportional 
share of exports, and that leads people to think that the country’s economy 
is dependent on the sourcing of those commodities: Copper (USD 30.95 B); 
Automobiles (USD 4.99 B); Petroleum (USD 3.6 B); Wood pulp (USD 2.64 B); 
Fish (USD 2.12 B); Electronics (USD 1.56 B).
Nevertheless, in the category copper and derivatives, around 50% of ex-
ports have added value, with refined copper products topping the category. 
The fact that copper has a disproportionate share in the country’s exports 
might not be problematic and shows a mature economy where the manage-
ment of resources is, in line with Fresard’s assessment, sustainable. “To the 
extent that being a high-income country is determined by GNI per capita, it is 
naturally an economic result. There are many differences between the ways to 
reach this result”. Fresard explained that that is the reason why other variables 
have been incorporated to try to improve the measurements of economic de-
velopment and wellness of countries like indicators of happiness of societies. 
Poverty and inequality remain being a challenge in most high-income coun-
tries and developed societies such as the United States. 
Comparatively, Chile still is one of the most unequal countries within the 
OECD rankings, coming up at 0.46 within the GINI score as of 2014 (OECD, 
2016) and currently second to last ahead of Mexico. Regionally speaking, 
Chile is also one of the most unequal countries in South America, just sur-
passed by Paraguay, Colombia, Brazil and Suriname. So, although income 
per capita is high, many other elements of Chile prove it still is not too far off 
from indicators other than income per capita when compared to other regional 
economies, sharing some characteristics with them.
Reflections on history and policies
Many scholars explain Chile’s economic growth as stemming from the 
adoption of neoliberal economic policies and the opening of its economy. To 
this, Fresard said that it remains a controversial issue. There are authors who 
would respond affirmatively, but others point out that the adoption of "Key-
nesian" policies helped to have a sustained growth. In addition, the political 
stability that Chile has had after the return to democracy in 1990 has been an 
important element to support the rapid economic growth.
At least partly, market-friendly government policies used to encourage tra-
de and economic openness granted Chile’s success. Some of those policies 
were implemented towards the end of the Pinochet dictatorship but found its 
peak after Chile’s return to democracy. Political and economic stability, coun-
tercyclical fiscal policy, a perceptive government during good times willing to 
increase spending in bad periods, economic and commercial openness, and 
investments in infrastructure and education are all factors that played a role in 
what has been called “Latin America’s economic miracle”. All of the above has 
allowed the Chilean government to benefit from the commodities boom of the 
past two decades while adequately facing international crises.
The first step of Chilean reforms and policies leaned in from opening the 
country to global trade. The mentality of many Chileans was to be incorpo-
rated into the global economy and to learn how to incorporate global trends 
as local habits. Tariff reductions as well as trading off flat trade rates with the 
MAP | REVISTA MUNDO ASIA PACÍFICO | Vo. 8, No. 1328
use of an impeccable commercial diplomacy are examples of that. “Both the 
reduction in the tariff and the transparency gained from a flat system were 
fundamental to achieving the competitiveness that the Chilean companies ne-
eded to compete worldwide” (Büchi, 2006: 4).
Another early step involved a policy shift influencing the levels of privatiza-
tion of national- relevant industries in the country:
In fact, important sectors such as electricity generation, distribution and 
telecommunications were still managed by state companies. After we 
implemented a massive privatization plan that included more than 50,000 
new direct shareholders and several million indirect (through pension funds) 
shareholders. Private entrepreneurs that carried out important expansion plans 
managed these companies (Büchi, 2006: 7).
From there on, the country managed to open up and granted evolution 
of major industries. From here, what truly performed well was the way the 
government intervened within the economy, subtly protecting key industries, 
granting them with low interest loans, and boosting their competitiveness with 
a regionally unparalleled exports promotion agenda. Investments in social 
welfare paired with the growth of strong institutions led self-control and self-
regulation in the development of the economy. The progress of public agen-
cies created to work within different factions of the economy have maintained 
the momentum to conduct structural reforms and pursue growth:
To achieve permanent results, social and economic reforms must count on an 
institutional framework that provides stability. The 1980 Constitution strengthened 
property rights, which were key to guaranteeing a favorable environment for 
investment and enterprise. Likewise, the Constitution established the autonomy 
of the Central Bank, which later restricted its own lending operations to the 
financial sector. This limitation eliminated one of the primary sources of inflation. 
The Constitution also restricted government spending, which now requires the 
approval of a law by special quorum (Büchi, 2006: 9).
However, as is has been made clear, policies have opened up to realties 
that Chile face towards the future. As copper prices have taken a hit, future 
policies must lean in towards changing this focus in terms of economic 
development.
Chile's long-term economic outlook rests on its ability to maintain prudent 
policies to bolster its non-mining sectors. The end of the commodity boom has 
exposed Chile's continuing dependence on copper exports, particularly to China, 
as economic activity remains leveraged to shifts in global economic conditions. 
With copper production likely to grow only modestly in the coming decade, 
Chile's long-term economic growth necessitates diversification (Chile Country 
Risk Report, 2018: 23).
This is an important prospect into the future: although current work to esta-
blish the value chain onto further integrating with foreign markets has succee-
ded and helped to expand copper exports, the future economic performance 
of the country depends on Chile leading to invest in other economic sector 
and work to potentiate these. This includes investing heavily on the service 
sector, which base their advancement in how much the country invests in in-
novation and technological education. “While government efforts to support 
private investment and reform its education system suggest that Chilean po-
licymakers are committed to forward-looking policy, lack of progress in either 
area is likely to undermine long-term growth prospects” (Chile Country Risk 
Report, 2018: page 24). If Chile does not act upon this necessity, they will be-
gin to return into facing the problematic situation the middle-income trap very 
common in most of the countries in Latin America. 
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Strong commercial diplomacy
One leading aspect Chile has forged in its post-dictatorship history was 
its impeccable commercial diplomacy and the reach the government had in 
creating important trade decisions and agreements all over the world. During 
the 1990s, Chile had begun to look into projects to expand themselves into a 
more globalized community, first focusing on creating regional partnerships.
Regarding international economic policy, this implied persisting in opening up and 
promoting trade agreements, especially with Latin America. Andrés Rebolledo– 
former Ministry of Energy- indicates that this option was not exclusive, since in 
addition to negotiating with the countries of the region, Chile maintained interest 
and explored other alliances (DIRECON, 2009: 198).
From here, Chile began an incredible expansion process into developing 
commercial ties with their regional neighbors. They began with some starting 
initiatives like creating pacts with Bolivia, Mercosur, and Venezuela in the 
early 1990s and moved onto signing their first Free Trade Agreement with 
Canada in 1997. Since then and until 2010, they signed another nine Free 
Trade Agreements – FTAs, with important international markets like the USA, 
Mexico, Australia, EFTA and South Korea as well as with regional partners 
like Colombia and Peru5. To this date, the country accounts for 26 different 
agreements, 15 of them being FTAs. By the year 2010 Chile’s economy was 
already reaping the benefits of these accords.
 S-F / Shutterstock.com
5 For the full list of treaties signed between 
Chile and the countries they currently 
hold commercial ties with you can review 
DIRECON’s list at https://www.direcon.
gob.cl/acuerdos-comerciales/ where you 
can see not only who they signed a deal 
with but also the full treaty itself.
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Sustained economic growth has been possible thanks to the vigor of exports 
and investments. The country has achieved a broad and diversified insertion in 
its international economic relations: around 90% of its foreign trade is carried out 
within the framework of agreements negotiated with different economies of the 
world (DIRECON, 2009: 204).
Their diplomatic approach to entering commercial relations post 
dictatorship stands in hand into part of the success to Chile’s economic 
growth, capitalizing on their entrance into foreign markets and being 
successful in directing their national brand. An important player in all of this has 
been the General Direction of International Economic Relations (DIRECON as 
for its Spanish acronym). The public entity, created by the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations of Chile, manage everything that dictates foreign commercial 
relations.
DIRECON was created back in 1979 and since then has been the main 
actor in terms of exercising the government’s interests in foreign trade. 
Through DIRECON, they have created ProChile, another entity that focused on 
managing the “Chile” national brand while opening commercial possibilities 
in other countries and gathering relevant information to support exports. They 
account of having 50 offices across the world and 15 offices regionally to 
allow for businesses in Chile to look into foreign markets with an edge and 
assistance by the Chilean government.
ProChile inspired several exports promotion agencies across the region, 
including Colombia’s ProColombia. These entities that work alongside the 
government’s interests have shown that through commercial relations Chile 
has been able to expand and develop its national economy into entering foreign 
markets and sustaining growth in doing so, while reducing dependency on 
commodities, shielding from sharp market fluctuations and improving terms 
of trade.
Evolving investment in R&D and education
Research and development are key aspects to an evolving economy and 
Chile’s interest in developing its knowledge base has been crucial towards 
such a development. The fact of the matter is that although Chile’s income 
has sparked interest in its success, remains that in the long term. If Chile 
does not restructure its investment in innovation, it could soon begin to see 
signs of falling behind. At first glance, the amount of GDP percentage invested 
into R&D is very low. Only 0.38% of its GDP was invested in 2015, very low 
compared to other Latin American countries like Brazil (1.16%), Argentina 
(0.58%), and Mexico (0.53%)6: all middle-income economies. In regards to 
other OECD nations, Chile ranks as one of the lowest in the group, with the 
overall average being a staggering 2.5%. This lack of innovation easily shows 
up in Chile’s knowledge base. Through an OECD report in 2018:
Despite the progress of the last decade, Chile still has a limited knowledge 
base. A growing number of Chileans pursue graduate degrees, but few do so in 
relevant areas for future competitiveness: 3% of graduates are in information and 
communication technology (ICT), and only 1% in natural sciences, mathematics 
and statistics (the lowest share of all OECD countries) (OECD, 2018: 28).
With recent interest during Bachelet’s presidency towards offering free 
education to people across the country, the government has also set up 
agencies to help develop educational opportunities for their young nationals. 
Through the National Commission for Scientific and Technological Research 
or CONICYT, Chile has begun to invest into educational programs from the 
basic levels of education to more investment into developing masters and 
6 All of these sets of data are taken directly 
off of the World Bank database, in parti-
cular Research and development expen-
diture (% of GDP).
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PhDs. Yet these programs focused on an educational basis. Educational 
evolution can lead to a future generation of innovation; however, there are not 
many systems that allow enterprises or entrepreneurs to evolve and improve 
current practices.
To promote business innovation, the strategy has proposed the development 
of dynamics of accumulation of relevant knowledge in strategic sectors (those 
where the country has comparative advantages, high growth potential and deficit 
of social capital) in order to generate true clusters of innovation around them. 
This effort, which forms the basis of the cluster development policy, is essential 
to generate greater diversification and productive sophistication in the country 
(together with the development of the ecosystem for innovation) (CNIC, 2010: 38).
What is most surprising about this report is that the recommendations 
by the CNIC do not reflect any boost of current innovation trends rather the 
establishment of some. These include mechanisms for loan programs to en-
trepreneurs, the development of institutions dedicated to bettering the scien-
ces in the country, and support innovation within established companies. This 
shows that Chile setting up initial programs for innovation, and although are 
already conscious about them, will take time and effort in doing so. In spite 
of the latter, there has not been a marked de-acceleration in the Chilean eco-
nomy unlike in other countries in the region. Long-term public policy focus is 
the essence of Chile’s new economic plan towards developing further current 
industries and finding where else the country could potentially participate in 
given its current competitive advantages.
Strengthening of institutions and battling corruption
Another important aspect of Chile’s recent success in the region has been 
by the strength the government and institutions have had in against corrup-
tion. Since 2012 Chile has been growing as succeeding in being a more trans-
parent country. Transparency International, an NGO dedicated to measuring 
the perception and power of corruption across the globe, currently ranks Chile 
the 24th most transparent country in the world after a 2016 study7. This could 
be linked to the work Chile has put into combating corruption within its political 
and economic structure. 
From these efforts, the country has birthed Chile Transparente, a non-profit 
organization that looks to create networking systems with industry leaders 
and national politicians to ensure the development of proper practices while 
combating corruption. Starting from 1998 all the way to our present time, this 
organization has worked to develop a systematic evaluation of how Chile can 
look to combat corruption and reduce the presence of such. In conjunction 
with Transparency International, Chile Transparente has managed to develop 
the Transparency in Corporate Reporting (or TRAC) which is a methodology 
created to evaluate the information that is publicly reported by companies in 
the country to evaluate the current status of their anti-corruption policies. All 
of this with the best interest of Chile to lead the charge in safe- proofing its 
economy from both public sector and private sector corruption dynamics.
While these initial findings look nice on paper, recent development of large 
corruption scandals in Latin America has also brought attention towards Chile. 
The reality is that although Chile’s fight against corruption has been strong, 
it still has a way to go. In 2014-2015, several top flight scandals by industry 
financial juggernauts The Penta Group and chemical developers: Sociedad 
Química y Minera de Chile S.A. were caught in tax evasion scandals that 
rocked the nation. Not just that but during Bachelet’s presidency her own 
family under the Caval group were caught in obtaining loans to turn investment 
into profit fast after obtaining insider information.
7 The report ranks Chile as 24 in the globe 
and 4th in the Americas, behind Canada, 
the USA, and the Bahamas. The focus on 
their report is the perception of corruption 
and sees where in the world political and 
economic scandals affect the most.
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With the image of the president’s family involved in corruption scandals, 
Bachelet had to increase Chile’s anti-corruption mechanisms but had been 
hit hard with social discontent. “The Chilean government’s strong institutional 
response was fueled by the broad public outcry and important political 
consensus on the severity of the problem” (Casas & Carter, 2017). Not only 
had she lost approval rating in the process, but also her son had to step down 
from being involved in high-profile positions.
Although the result of this scandal was the birth of more government 
mechanisms to combat corruption it still shows that Chile has a way to go. 
Yet, as Casas and Carter (2017) state: “the integrity challenges that matter 
and drive people to the keyboard or onto the street in Chile or Uruguay are 
hardly comparable to those in Venezuela or Honduras.” With that in mind 
although Chile still has aspects to work on, it is in a further position regarding 
anti- corruption than its regional neighbors. An aspect that still reinforces the 
success Chile has had in its development.
Has Chile overcome the trap? Not entirely
The success of Chile has been overall well perceived, especially in 
Latin America with some countries willing to copy-and-paste public policy 
measures inspired by the success experience of the country. Brazil, Argentina, 
Colombia, Peru and Ecuador do not account for the economic growth and 
development Chile has fostered during the last 30 years. However, this is not 
to say that everything for Chile is in top form. The reality is that Chile did found 
a way out of the middle-income trap but needs deep reforms in order to battle 
staggering inequality and other welfare indicators. 
One of the starting points is that Chile still lacks evolution in its production 
methods, basically taking a hit form their lack of innovation as mentioned 
in a previous section. “As already mentioned, what you export matters and 
therefore the quality of competitiveness should be taken into account as 
well. In the case of Chile, it still relies heavily on primary exports, especially 
of copper. Being more efficient does not equate to being more innovative” 
(Dingemans, 2016: 656). This also shows based of the loss in complexity of 
their exports, a valuable asset for any developing country (especially those 
within the ranking of the OECD):
This means that over the last 40 years, Chile’s economic complexity has 
diminished on average further than that of any other country in Latin America, and 
therefore its economic success, however impressive, is based on efficiency gains 
in low- productivity, economically less sophisticated sectors. Despite the fact that 
Chile possesses, in general, an excellent hard and soft infrastructure with human 
capital being its Achilles’ heel, according to the 2013 Global Competitiveness 
Report), it has been unable to spur innovation (Dingemans, 2016: 661).
Bearing these aspects, it can be said that Chile is still far from avoiding 
falling into some of the holes of the middle-income trap it is stated to have left. 
Although indicators of Chile’s GNI per capita reflect those of a high-income 
country as they are indexed within various indicators. The reality of middle 
income is not related to the amount you make rather their excellence, or as 
stated by Agenor (2015) “It is often not the quantity of production inputs (pu-
blic or private) that matters, but rather their quality”. Agenor later goes off into 
explaining that 
Indeed, the fundamental source of multiple equilibria in a middle-income trap 
is often related to the lack of innovation activity–itself related to poor quality of 
human capital, which may prevent a country from escaping a low or moderate-
growth equilibrium–rather than, say, low savings, poor nutrition, lack of basic 
infrastructure, etc., as typically observed in low-income countries (page 11).
MAP | REVISTA MUNDO ASIA PACÍFICO | Vo. 8, No. 1333
Bearing this in mind you could say that Chile faces a paradoxical situation, 
one where their income is that of a high-income country but still reflect structu-
ral problems that reverse their status within an income trap. Dingemans offers 
one last view on this situation:
(…) In order to maintain progress in its economic development, it is more than 
likely that its current strategy is inadequate and that, additionally, conditions are 
present to expect a probable success in implementing industrial policies, not 
by introducing a hegemonic state, but by means of an entrepreneurial state that 
pays attention to legitimizing economic strategies (Dingemens, 2016; 664).
Yet, beyond this reality that Chile has a way to go before truly escaping 
the trap, especially in terms of innovation, we can still declare this a true suc-
cess story. The evolution of Chilean policies post-dictatorship, its approach to 
commercial diplomacy, and its rapid growth show that through policy reforms, 
the state can play a role in bettering the economic situation of a country to a 
point where they excel further than even the largest economies in the region 
like Brazil, Colombia and Argentina. While Chile still finds aspects, it needs to 
work in. It has done more into pushing further from the middle-income trap 
than many in the region. Thus prove that beyond the concept of neo-libe-
ralism, what most satisfied Chile’s growth was its political pursuit of finding 
a structural path towards development, which will ultimately feed into future 
expeditions towards transforming its economy.
 S-F / Shutterstock.com
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Conclusion
Chile has been an inspiration for many to escape the rankings of middle 
income. They have done it through well-developed institutional policies that 
reflect open mechanisms in both financial and economic structures. They 
have created value chains in their exports by reaching out and entering 
foreign markets through their various agreements signed and ratified by their 
government. However, what Chile also shows is that high income does not 
mean escaping the trap that many middle-income countries finds them in. 
The debate stands at it being a case of quality over quantity, a focus that 
what takes developed countries into high ranking positions on how well they 
perform is not based around how much they export rather what they export 
and how much of it they do.
As necessary conditions to have a rapid economic growth that can be 
sustained during long periods of time and even in the face of economic crisis, 
the Chilean case allows to abstract the following requirements: political stability, 
sound economic policies, a balanced fiscal policy, a government favoring 
long-term commitments over short term decisions, and economic openness 
paired with an impeccable commercial diplomacy. Such an environment is 
supportive for economic development, allowing traditional industries to move 
up the value ladder.
Ultimately though it demonstrates that, like all economies, evolution and 
innovation are the next step towards development. What truly establishes 
value is not how much wealth comes into a nation and how equally it is 
distributed rather the real end product a country produces. If Chile wants to 
further its chances into potentially being the most developed economy in Latin 
America it must, like China, focus on innovation and development of new 
industries, with the idea that the only way to sustain growth in the long-run 
and create social welfare out of it is through having above standard products 
that are knowledge-intensive and not labor- intensive. If a country like Chile 
keeps producing basic goods at standard levels as they do today, for as much 
as they may be considered high-income that situation will be stuck in not 
increasing exports and look to rewind into an income trap.
A bigger question here is that what economic standard can tell us if 
an economy is one to model after? After all, high income for Chile only 
reflects statistical proportions of their trade income but does not reflect the 
faults in Chile’s lack of innovative industries and deviation from focusing on 
commodities and agricultural exports. The reality is that this country is a proper 
example for good fiscal and monetary policies functioning in conjunction rather 
than excelling in exports and product quality. Their use of their agreements to 
push exports further has only demonstrated that their government has been 
working effectively, and that although their exports are important had they 
not been backed up policies to efficiently work them into the market none of 
Chile’s success would have been possible.
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